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ABSTRACT

This short essay introduces papers presented at the symposium Contracting over Privacy, which
took place at the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at the University of Chicago in
fall 2015. The essay highlights a quiet legal transformation whereby the entire area of data privacy law has been subsumed by consumer contract law. It offers a research agenda for privacy
law based on the contracting-over-privacy paradigm.

1. INTRODUCTION

Big Data is an engine of profound changes in our society and a major
stimulant of economic growth. Internet services that never existed, like
searching, social networking, and online shopping, are now a source of
major personal welfare. The Internet of Things transformed machines
that used to provide simple static functionality into data-intensive personalized aids. Overall, data-driven services and devices are widely embraced by consumers.
These “smart” products are popular because they use the vast information network to help consumers improve usage and save money. But
the firms that provide them also use the same data to determine people’s
interests and shopping profiles and then make money by selling personalized “behavioral” ads and additional products. A mobile GPS app that
tracks people’s location can help them get to their destinations more
smoothly but also helps advertisers tailor location-specific ads. A tracking
device that auto insurers offer to their policyholders can help price the
policies more accurately and even reduce auto accidents and insurance
premiums but also provides insurers a wealth of information about peo-
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ple’s behavior, information that might be used in ways their customers do
not expect.
In the era of technology-powered phones, cars, alarms, wallets, toothbrushes, and physical activity trackers, users’ privacy has become a central regulatory preoccupation. Around the world, lawmakers are trying
to keep up with the commercial data-collection enterprise and to secure
basic rights for their customers, like the EU’s “right to be forgotten” and
its General Data Protection Regulation. In the United States, agencies like
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) have worked to tighten their oversight of firms’ data
practices. There is, however, a percolating sense among privacy advocates that the existing protective scheme is too weak, leaving too much
freedom for firms to engage in surveillance and in monitoring of people
and thereby to gain control over citizens’ lives in a way that threatens
their autonomy, intimacy, authenticity, and other important values. The
fundamental question that these lawmakers and privacy advocates are
asking is whether “contract” has gone too far to subsume privacy law.
Has it become too easy for people to contractually waive privacy rights?
Are people even aware that they are doing so? Should the freedom to
contract over privacy be restricted?

2. THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTING OVER PRIVACY

The case for stricter regulation of firms’ data privacy practices and the
precise levers such regulation ought to deploy depend on the answer to
a fundamental question: are markets failing to provide optimal privacy
protection? In environments in which consumers care about their privacy,
it might be thought that markets for data are the solution, not the problem. According to this standard line of thought, firms that want to lure
consumers and prompt them to pay more for their services would promise their clientele greater privacy protection. In the same way that firms
compete over warranties or the quality of customer service, data-driven
firms could offer consumers privacy-protective platforms to gain a competitive edge. Firms have learned, for example, that offering customers
no-contract arrangements (which allow early termination of the service
without penalty) appeals to noncommitters. Firms could similarly offer
no-prying arrangements to appeal to privacy seekers. Markets, rather
than regulation, could potentially provide the desired privacy features.
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Indeed, some Internet service providers are offering pay-for-privacy plans
that cost more but involve no data collection and liberate the bounty-
paying users from behavioral ads and privacy disturbances (Bode 2016).
There are several specific market mechanisms by which privacy might
be regulated, rather than by the government. The primary one is contract.
Since the privacy practices that firms employ are part of the contract between the firm and the consumer (often included in the terms of service),
this contract becomes a platform for regulation of the parties’ privacy
rights. Consumers who give up some privacy receive in return something
that they value more, often a price discount.
Regulation of privacy by contract occurs when firms promise to forgo
otherwise available opportunities to use or collect personal information.
They offer their customers a menu of choices, and people self-select. Like
any other aspect of product quality, contracts can do the bulk of regulation—of creating and limiting rights. In the same way that people choose
the duration of their service contracts, the coverage declarations of their
insurance contracts, or the data package for their smartphones, they
would choose their personally desired privacy rules. Public regulation is
generally not necessary to establish mandatory durations, declarations,
or data allocations, and it would similarly not be necessary in setting privacy protection.
This conclusion is rebutted if contracting involves negative externalities. There is some reason to think that choices about privacy and security
could involve externalities, and the presence of these externalities ought
to provide some basis for overriding personal preferences if the stakes are
high enough (Allen 1999; Ayres 2016). For example, unraveling and related dynamics put significant pressure on people to keep up with o
 thers
who publicize personal information (Schwartz 2004; Peppet 2011). Likewise, firms may not compete over data security if highlighting such aspects alerts otherwise uninformed consumers to new risks and dampens
overall demand.
Another limit to contracting is transactions cost. Ordinarily, this concern suggests that law should play a relatively modest role of providing
a set of privacy rights default rules. These privacy rights would govern
the relationship between the firm and the client, but only in the absence
of explicit contractual clauses on the matter. This is the gap-filling role
that the law assumes in many other areas of contracting, and the main
goal of preset default rules is to save the parties the hassle of expressly
drafting them. The well-documented problem with this permissive regula-
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tory approach is its weakness. Firms are able to override the substantive
provisions embedded in the defaults by asking their customers to agree to
a different set of terms. Thus, in an era in which most consumer transactions are accompanied by long predrafted standard-form agreements, and
where it is exceedingly easy to elicit the consumer’s assent to the terms,
much of the regulation of privacy rights would be performed by contracts
drafted in-house, not by laws that establish default rules.
Finally, efficient contracting faces informational and behavioral barriers. As in many areas of consumer contracting, the asymmetries in sophistication, knowledge, and stakes make it questionable whether consumers would effectively self-select into the packages of legal terms that
best serve their heterogeneous interests. Unlike service durations, insurance declarations, or smartphone data allocations, privacy rights deal
with matters that are not intuitive for consumers. It is enough to eyeball
a typical privacy policy notice to realize that it governs mysterious issues:
what type of information is being collected, how it is used, with whom
it is shared, how long it is kept, and how it is protected. This complexity
opens a fertile ground for the incorporation of behavioral factors into the
understanding of privacy decision making (Adjerid, Samat, and Acquisti
2016).
Failures of imagination are widespread in privacy contracting because
new and unanticipated uses of old data are constantly arising. Privacy
policies are often written in ways that are truly confusing (Reidenberg
et al. 2016). Further, these privacy policies also change over time (firms
include a modification clause in the notice, which allows them to make
such changes). And even if understanding one such policy is manageable,
they come in battalions. Each website, financial arrangement, visit to a
clinic, or new mobile app presents its own privacy practices. Any effort to
master this accumulated complexity is infeasible, and any attempt to do
so is irrational. According to one estimate, the average person encounters
so many privacy disclosures every year that it would take 76 days to read
them, and the lost time would cost the economy $781 billion (McDonald
and Cranor 2008).
The complexity of contract terms dealing with privacy is a major obstacle for efficient private contracting. It poses a serious challenge for
market regulation of privacy, but it may not be a fatal one. Privacy is not
the only aspect of contracting that involves significant underlying complexity. Many other dimensions of consumer contracts are complicated
but nevertheless bargained over and tailored to consumers’ preferences.
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Consumers do not understand the complexity of automobile mechanical
design or the electronics that operate their laptops but are able to rely
on market signals to make propitious choices. Their decisions are made
manageable by various market-generated scores that aggregate the underlying loads of information and rate or rank the performance of the product and the satisfaction that similarly situated consumers derived from it.
Such market indices foster competition over the otherwise complex and
obscure features and thus complement the contract mechanism.
Accordingly, a central question for the contracting-over-privacy inquiry is the viability of privacy scores and ratings designed to simplify privacy choices. Some such tools are available, like the website
PrivacyGrade.org or the TRUSTe privacy compliance certification. Yet,
unlike ratings from Consumer Reports or Zagat, these privacy scores are
not relied on heavily. Is it because, despite being counseled otherwise,
people do not care much about their data privacy?
The answer is probably yes: most people do not care much about
data privacy. When prompted by surveys, they might nod in agreement
and announce that privacy matters, but when asked to pay for it, they
are strikingly stingy. Some studies have found that people are willing to
pay no more than a few dollars to prevent their apps from harvesting
their smartphone data, no more than half a penny per search to make
it private, and no more than $15 per year to avoid automated content
analysis of their e-mail messages (Savage and Waldman 2013; Preibusch
2015; Strahilevitz and Kugler 2016). Maybe people will eventually learn
to cherish their data privacy more, but at present the privacy tempest is
in a teapot.

3. THE LAW OF CONTRACTING OVER PRIVACY

Contracting over privacy is of course permissible, but how do such contracts form? What is the legal status of privacy notices posted on websites, incorporated in mobile apps, or otherwise communicated to consumers? Surprisingly, this basic question has not received a simple and
coherent answer in the privacy law commentary. The lack of definitive
analysis has produced puzzling treatments by courts and unorthodox
scholarly proposals.
This question of whether online privacy notices are contracts has
created confusion in part because privacy law is longing for a different
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notion of consent than general consumer contract law. Privacy law as a
whole is a collage of legal doctrines from different areas, still struggling
to identify the common underlying values and objectives (Kugler 2014).
For example, a recent draft of the Principles of the Law, Data Privacy
counts numerous sources for the regulation of privacy, what it calls “an
interrelated amalgam of different types of law, including federal and state
constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, tort law, evidentiary
privileges, property law, contract law, and criminal law” (Schwartz and
Solove 2016, intro. note, p. 1).
Privacy law has an uneasy relationship with contract. It has understandable ambitions to regulate a desirable baseline of privacy rights but
a less coherent view of whether these rights can be waived. On the one
hand, it is widely accepted that even when the law establishes baseline
privacy rights, individual consent could modify them. Individuals, for example, could sell their rights by granting firms permission to collect, use,
and share their personal information. This feature of the law appropriately accommodates heterogeneous preferences among subjects with respect to privacy and the associated tradeoffs. On the other hand, consent
to standard-form contracts is hardly ever informed or meaningful, and it
is hard to accept that such a passive ritual could undermine basic privacy
entitlements.
Many of these issues are not unique to privacy rights. In other areas of
contracting, courts have allowed passive assent to override pro-consumer
legally enacted background rules. But what about privacy rights? Have
they acquiesced to the same lenient contracting rules? Are consumers’
clicks to “agree” sufficient to disclaim privacy rights? Many lawsuits for
violations of privacy rights turn on the question of whether consumers
truly consented to the standard-form contract terms that purport to grant
the business the right to engage in its data practices. And yet the answer
to this question is thought to be unsettled. It is often taught that privacy
contracting is treated differently by courts than contracting over other
matters (like warranties or arbitration). It is also thought that such differential treatment of privacy contracts is justified, because the guidelines
concerning how to contract over privacy must come not from contract
law but from privacy law.
As a result, despite the central role that consent has in establishing the
scope of privacy rights, there is lingering confusion regarding the rules
that govern the mutual assent to privacy terms. There is, for example, a
prominent view that such rules must come from the doctrine of informed
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consent in tort law rather than from consumer contract law (Schwartz
and Solove 2014, sec. 4, comment A). Thus, rather than apply the ordinary rules of mutual assent—for example, the rule that determines how
standard-form contracts are formed and what counts as sufficient disclosure—privacy scholars put their faith in privacy-specific consent rules and
heightened notice requirements, which purport to apply only to agreements over data privacy (Schwartz and Solove 2014, secs. 3–4). In their
view, “[t]he form by which consent is obtained must be . . . based on the
type of personal data involved and the nature of the collection, use, or
sharing of the personal data.”
These heightened notice and assent requirements are inconsistent with
first principles of contract law. In general, the doctrine of mutual assent
requires parties to follow standard objective procedures, invariant to the
content of the agreement. These procedures have evolved in the digital
era, allowing standard contract terms to be adopted through relatively
passive and spontaneous forms of agreement. But the assent rules are one
and the same for all contracting matters—warranties, arbitration clauses,
disclaimers, termination penalties—including privacy rights. Despite
asymmetries between firms and consumers, courts apply the basic principle that individual assent overrides legally supplied protections and that
the process necessary to contract around such default protections does
not depend on their substance.
This principle—the content neutrality of contract formation doctrine—is overwhelmingly adhered to by courts. Its inverse—the idea
that courts ought to adopt privacy-specific contracting rules—is likewise
overwhelmingly rejected. A recent survey of all privacy disputes that
reached court judgment paints a telling picture (Bar-Gill, Ben-Shahar,
and Marotta-Wurgler 2016). Despite a holding by one court in the earlier
days of the Internet that “broad statements of company [privacy] policy
do not generally give rise to contract claims” (Dyer v. Northwest Airlines, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 [D.N.D. 2004])—a precedent that privacy scholars have taken as authoritative in describing the state of the
law (see, for example, Solove and Schwartz 2011; Solove and Hartzog
2014)—the law has shaped up quite differently. To date, among 51 cases
in which courts addressed this issue, only in five cases did courts decide
that privacy notices are not contracts. All the remaining cases treated privacy notices as contracts. While most of these cases are unpublished federal district court cases, the conclusion is crystal clear: privacy policies
are typically recognized and enforced as contracts.
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What are the legal implications of the classification of privacy notices
as enforceable consumer contracts? For firms, the contractual nature of
privacy notices ensures two beneficial functions. First, privacy notices are
deployed to shield firms against liability for data privacy practices that,
absent consumer consent, would violate privacy laws. For example, absent consent, Gmail’s practice of scanning contents of users’ e-mail messages would be a violation of the Wiretap Act, and Facebook’s practice of
identifying users in uploaded photos would be a violation of state privacy
laws. The contractual status of privacy notices means that users grant
consent to these practices and thus provide firms a critical safe harbor.
The second function that privacy notices perform is the assurance for
consumers that some uses of the data, which are otherwise permissible
even without consent, would not occur. For example, firms and websites
may keep logs of customers’ activity, but they can promise in their privacy notices not to do so. If privacy notices are contracts, such promises are binding, and their breach would be actionable. Moreover, the
FTC can (and does) treat breaches of these promises as deceptive trade
practices. Avowing such potential liability is a credible way for firms to
entice hesitant consumers to engage with them. Firms dealing with sensitive content, like adult websites, indeed make explicit and clear promises
to limit data sharing with third parties, and cloud-computing sites make
explicit promises to follow stringent data security standards (Marotta-
Wurgler 2016).
The contractual nature of privacy notices has significant implications
for lawmakers working to design statutory privacy protections. The first
implication is for the design of default rules. If statutory privacy rights
are merely default rules, lawmakers should anticipate wholesale opt outs.
Firms that develop business models that are constrained by statutory privacy rules would post privacy notices that effectively override these rules.
The powerful incentives of firms to induce their customers to give up
their privacy rights also suggests that the choice between opt-in and optout schemes is of less importance than people usually assume. Opt-in
schemes are thought to be more protective, because they require firms to
get consumers’ affirmative consent to override the pro-consumer status
quo. Opt-out schemes, by contrast, put the burden on consumers to initiate the exit from the pro-business status quo. Recent FCC regulations,
for example, present the shift to an opt-in regime as a meaningful step toward more privacy protection, as this regime requires consumers’ explicit
consent before collecting sensitive data such as geographical location or
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financial information. But firms are very good at getting consumers to opt
in when doing so furthers the businesses interest (Willis 2013), and businesses are able to ask consumers repeatedly to change their minds if they
initially resist information sharing. If indeed firms elicit such consumer
consent with great ease, the opt-in framework makes little difference.
Once again, consumers may so easily agree to opt in, or fail to opt
out, because of lack of information. Informed consumers might refuse to
opt in or might initiate their own opt outs. These consumers would walk
away from firms that refuse to provide the statutory privacy protections
that they demand. Uninformed consumers, by contrast, would stick with
any default rule. In such an environment of imperfect information, designing optimal default rules has to account for two separate concerns.
First, it has to recognize that there are consumers who do care and who
would seek to opt out of an undesirable default rule. For some, the default rule could be insufficiently protective, and they would look for more
protection. For others, it would be too protective, and they would prefer to waive the protection for a price discount. These opt outs create
transactions costs (the cost of becoming informed about the default rule
as well as the cost of contracting around it), and a well-designed default
rule has to minimize such costs. But the design of the default rule has to
recognize, in addition, that many consumers would remain uninformed
about the default rule and refrain from opting out, regardless of its content. For this group the default rule is sticky, and it ought to be designed
with an eye to maximizing the value of the transaction. This is a general
insight into the optimal design of default rules in consumer contracts: it
has to meet two criteria—minimizing the cost of opt outs and maximizing the value of transactions when opt outs do not occur (Bar-Gill and
Ben-Shahar 2016).
An additional implication of the contractual nature of privacy notices
is the role of disclosures. Contracts over privacy—like any other consumer standard-form contract—are often long and complex. Is there a
way to make such contracts simpler? Can the law require firms to present consumers pared-down versions of these privacy notices that would
effectively inform consumers of the privacy risks? These questions have
risen to the fore of consumer protection law in many areas, as regulators and commentators spend much effort to design simpler, smarter, and
user-friendlier disclosures. In the privacy area, the proposals to utilize
best practices in the presentation of privacy notices have been widely embraced, and more radical suggestions to use “nutrition facts”–type warn-
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ing boxes are also intuitively advocated. But would such efforts have the
desired effect on informing consumers’ choices? There is some evidence
that the answer is no (Ben-Shahar and Chilton 2016) and that the use of
the privacy notice to engender trust may be limited (Martin 2016).
In the end, then, the law and economics of contracting over privacy
differs only in detail, but not in principle, from the law and economics of
consumer contracts. Courts overwhelmingly treat them in the same way,
and for good reasons. Consumers’ consent may be ill-informed, but regulatory alternatives might be worse. Consumer contract law has tools to
combat overreaching by firms, and these tools—rather than superfluous
notions of heightened disclosure or informed consent—ought to guide
privacy protection. Such tools allow courts to strike down intolerable
provisions, and in a separate article we propose to deny firms the advantages that they bury in cryptic boilerplate (Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz
2016).
Accordingly, the papers from the symposium Contracting over Privacy collected in this issue examine general questions of contract formation, design, interpretation, and extracontractual norms and trust—all in
the context of privacy. Privacy is not sui generis; it is instead a valuable
laboratory to examine the evolution of contract law in the digital era.

REFERENCES

Adjerid, Idris, Sonam Samat, and Alessandro Acquisti. 2016. A Query-Theory Perspective of Privacy Decision Making. Journal of Legal Studies 45:S97–S121.
Allen, Anita L. 1999. Coercing Privacy. William and Mary Law Review 40:723–
57.
Ayres, Ian. 2016. Contracting for Privacy Precaution (and a Laffer Curve for
Crime). Journal of Legal Studies 45:S123–S136.
Bar-Gill, Oren, and Omri Ben-Shahar. 2016. Optimal Defaults in Consumer Markets. Journal of Legal Studies 45:S137–S161.
Bar-Gill, Oren, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler. 2016. Searching for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of
Consumer Contracts. University of Chicago Law Review 83 (forthcoming).
Ben-Shahar, Omri, and Adam Chilton. 2016. Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test. Journal of Legal Studies 45:S41–S67.
Ben-Shahar, Omri, and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz. 2016. Interpreting Contracts via
Surveys and Experiments. Unpublished manuscript. University of Chicago
Law School, Chicago.

This content downloaded from 128.135.205.193 on January 10, 2017 11:21:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

INTRODUCTION /

S11

Bode, Ken. 2016. AT&T Charges Steep Premium for Privacy, Calls it a “Discount.” DSL Reports, March 17. https://www.dslreports.com/shownews/ATT
-Charges-Steep-Premium-for-Privacy-Calls-it-a-Discount-136511.
Kugler, Matthew B. 2014. Affinities in Privacy Attitudes: A Psychological Approach to Unifying Informational and Decisional Privacy. Unpublished manuscript. Northwestern University, Pritzker School of Law, Chicago.
Marotta-Wurgler, Florencia. 2016. Self-Regulation and Competition in Privacy
Policies. Journal of Legal Studies 45:S13–S39.
Martin, Kristen. 2016. Do Privacy Notices Matter? Comparing the Impact of Violating Formal Privacy Notices and Informal Privacy Norms on Consumer
Trust Online. Journal of Legal Studies 45:S191–S215.
McDonald, Alecia M., and Lorrie Faith Cranor. 2008. The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies. I/S: A Journal of Law and Privacy for the Information Society
4:540–65.
Peppet, Scott R. 2011. Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the
Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future. Northwestern University Law Review
105:1153–1203.
Preibusch, Soren. 2015. The Value of Web Search Privacy. IEEE Security and Privacy 13(5):24–32.
Reidenberg, Joel R., Jaspreet Bhatia, Travis D. Breaux, and Thomas B. Norton.
2016. Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of Regulation. Journal of
Legal Studies 45:S163–S190.
Savage, Scott, and Donald M. Waldman. 2013. The Value of Online Privacy. University of Colorado, Department of Economics, Boulder.
Schwartz, Paul M. 2004. Property, Privacy, and Personal Data. Harvard Law Review 117:2055–2128.
Schwartz, Paul M., and Daniel J. Solove. 2014. Principles of the Law, Data Privacy. Tentative draft no. 2, October 24. American Law Institute, Philadelphia.
———. 2016. Principles of the Law, Data Privacy. Council draft no. 1, September. American Law Institute, Philadelphia.
Solove, Daniel J., and Woodrow Hartzog. 2014. The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy. Columbia Law Review 114:583–676.
Solove, Daniel J., and Paul M. Schwartz. 2011. Privacy Law Fundamentals. 2d ed.
Portsmouth, NH: International Association of Privacy Professionals.
Strahilevitz, Lior Jacob, and Matthew B. Kugler. 2016. Is Privacy Policy Language
Irrelevant to Consumers? Journal of Legal Studies 45:S69–S95.
Willis, Lauren E. 2013. When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults. University of Chicago Law Review 80:1155–1229.

This content downloaded from 128.135.205.193 on January 10, 2017 11:21:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

